### 1

#### The narrative of progress structures us foreign policy; it reduces complex social issues to simple technical linear problem/solutions – their harms aren't true, they can't solve, and it turns case

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CONCLUSION The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a ﬁeld of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to inﬁnity. Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualiﬁed them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies ﬁt a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers’ apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality. At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an inﬁnite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, ﬁnally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulﬁlling the promises that development seemed to be making. After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, reﬁne its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a speciﬁc conﬁguration of factors and forces in which the new language of development ﬁnds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artiﬁcial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced. To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories. The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World.26 Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identiﬁed by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signiﬁers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a ﬁxity as signiﬁeds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### Specifically, the aff invokes the narrative of progress.

#### This rhetoric of progress also shapes academia as a space geared around promoting development projects. Consequently, the discourse dominates the classroom and leads to marginalization

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A crucial problem for development classroom interactions arises in the inherent separation between foreign teachers and their students in host communities: between foreign teachers positioned as representatives of developing nations, and recipients of foreign guidance and expertise. This pedagogical relationship reflects the broader discourses of development where, on a global scale, geographic or spatial distance and difference has been translated into chronological or temporal sequence: developing nations are merely at an earlier stage in a historical queue, positioned as perpetually 'catching up' to developed nations who represent a single standard. In Mignolo's words, this is the relocation of languages, peoples, and knowledge in time rather than space. Through this temporal paradigm, development discourses suggest a chronological hierarchy, a classification of nations and peoples based on one's place in the order of progress from tradition to modernity. Such discourses tend to represent the space of underdevelopment in ways that suggest a deficiency to be remedied by the introduction of 'advanced' First world knowledge made available through foreign aid. As a result, developing nations are not imagined as having their own trajectories, their own particular histories, and potential for their own, perhaps different, futures' (Massey, 2005:5). And for development expert, the temporal narrative of progress is affirmed through demonstrations of technological and economic superiority that simultaneously justify the authority of those in control of the discourse. Educational programed fit well into this overall scheme of developmental progress, ad are also internally structured according to a similarity linear narrative that shapes the classroom as a place dominated by teleological considerations. This has implications for both national development, figured within a global hierarchy of knowledge and progress, and individual development evolving along a cognitive and knowledge continuum. In the global hierarchy, despite a rhetoric values alternative A further problem that emerges in making connections with students and the world outside the classroom relates to expectations of professional distance, and the role of the teacher as knowing subject. On the one hand, English language teachers and development are positioned as knowledgeable experts, and are expected to maintain professional standards, approaching their task and their students with an objective detachment. The native speaker status and modern methods that form the basis of the foreign teachers' expertise help to position the teacher as the rational, knowing subject in control of the space of the classroom. On the other hand the expectation that teachers adapt their language teaching to the context of their students' lives assumes the need to develop an understanding of the students' world, and implies the building of a more democratic relation between teacher and student. The processes of balancing detachment authority and engagement/nurturing, and negotiating connections between the space inside and outside the classroom, are central to teaching practice and emerged as challenges for teachers in development contexts. Instrumental expectations attached to English as a key to securing social and economic advancement rely on powerful mythologies of progress that frame English as a mythical hero of development. The presence of English language speakers as international development consultants, experts and change agents, positions English as the means of connection with more privileged places in a more powerful world: so closely associated with the developed world, English is the language of opportunity and privilege.

#### The narrative of progress locks us into ignoring pressing economic, environmental, nuclear, and social issues that risk extinction because we believe our exceptionalism

**Loewen 07**(James W. "Jim" Loewen, American sociologist, historian, and author, University of Vermont, “Lies My Teacher Told Me”, page 285 – 286, 2007, RLA)

This is the America in which most textbook authors grew up and the America they still try to sell to students today. Perhaps textbooks do not question the notion that bigger is better because the idea of progress conforms with the way Americans like to think about education: arneliorative, leading step by step to opportunity for individuals and progress for the whole society. The ideology of progress also provides hope for the future. Certainly most Americans want to believe that their society has been, on balance, a boon and not a curse to mankind and to the planet. History textbooks go even further to imply that simply participating in society. Americans contribute to a notion that is constantly progressing and remains the hope of the world. As Boorstein and Kelley put it, near the end of A History of the United States, “ Americans – makers of something out of nothing – have delivered a new way of life to the far corners of the world.” Thus, the idea of American exceptionalism – the United States as the best country in the world – which starts in our textbooks with the Pilgrims, gets projected into the future. Faith in progress has played various functions in society and in American history textbooks. The faith has promoted the status quo in the most literal sense, for it proclaims that to progress we must simply do more of the same. This belief has been particularly useful to the upper class, because Americans would be persuaded to ignore the injustice of the social class if they thought the economic pie kept getting better for all. The idea of progress also fits in with social Darwinism, which implies that lower class lower owing to its own fault. Progress as an ideology has been intrinsically antirevolutionary: because things are getting better all the time, everyone should believe in the system. Portraying America so optimistically also helps textbooks with stand attacks by unpatriotic critics in Texas and other textbook adaptation states. Internationally, referring to have not countries as “developing nations” has helped the “developed nations” avoid facing the injustice of worldwide stratification. In reality “development” has been making Third World Nations poorer, compared to the First World. Per capita income in the First World was five times that in the Third Word in 1850, ten times in 1960, and fourteen times by 1970. It’s tricky to measure these ratios, partly because a dollar buys more in the Third World than in the First, but per capita income in the First world is now twenty to sixty times that in the Third World, The vocabulary of progress remains relentlessly hopeful, however, with regard to the “undeveloped.” As economist E.J. Mishan put it, “Complacency is suffused over the globe, by referring to these destitute and sometimes desperate countries by the fatuous no – menclature of ‘develiping nations.’ In the nineteenth century, progress provided an equally splendid rational for imperialism. Europeans and Americans saw themselves as performing government services for utilizing natural resources of natives in distant lands who were to backward to do it themselves. ¶ Almost every day brings new reasons for ecological concerns, from deforestation to the equator to ozone holes at the poles. Cancer rates climb and we don’t know why. We have no way to measure the full extend of human impact on earth . The average sperm count in healthy human males around the world has dropped nearly 50 percent over the past fifty years. If environmentally caused, this is no laughing matter, for sperm have only to decline in a straight line for another fifty years and we will have wiped out human kind without knowing how we did it. We Were similarly unaware for years that killing mosquitoes with DDT was wiping out birds of prey around the globe. Our increasing power makes it increasingly possible that humankind will make the earth uninhabitable by accident. Indeed, we almost have on several occasions. In the early 1990s, for example nations around the planet agreed to stop production of CFGs that damaged the ozone in the upper atmosphere. In 2006 Washington Post writer Joel Achenbach noted, “Scientists are haunted by realization that if CFCs had been made with a slightly different type of chemistry they’d have destroyed much of the ozone layer over the entire planet. We were simply lucky. All these considerations imply that more of the same economic development and nation state governance that brought us this far may not guide us to a livable planet in the long run. We do not simply face an energy crisis that might be solved if we only develop low – cost energy that does not pollute or cause global warming. On the contrary, if we had cheaper energy, imagine the havoc we might cause! Scientists have already envisioned how we could happily use it to decrease salinity of the seas, increase our arable Land, and in other ways make our planet nicer for us – in the short run. Instead, we must start treating the earth as if we plan to stay here. At some point in the future, perhaps before readers of today’s high school textbooks pass their fifteenth birthdays. Industrialized nations, including the United States may move towards steady state economies in their consumption of energy and raw materials. Thus, our oil crisis can best be viewed as a wake up call to change our ways. Second our use of oil (and all other fossil fuels) has a serious worldwide impact: global warming, As everyone knows, except some high school history textbook authors, this warming melts the polar ice caps, causing sea levels to rise. Oceans rose one foot in the last century. The most conservative estimates, embraced by the George W Bush Administration, predicts they will rise another three feet in this century. Around the world --- from Mexico to Venace to much of Bangladesh – hundreds of millions of people live close enough to sea level that this rise will endager their lives and occupations. The resulting dislocation will constitute the biggest crisis mankind has faced since the beginning a recorded history. And this is the most pleasant estimate. If the Greenland Ice Sheet Ricses the ocean may rise twenty three feet. Scientists James Lovelock in 1970 famously invented the “Gaia Hypothesus,” the idea that the earth acts as a homeostatic system. Recently Lovelock has pointed out that as Earth’s equilibrium gets disturbed, some disequilibrium processes may cause even faster warming. As the polar ice cap melts, for example , they no longer reflect the son’s rays, so the earth absorbs more heat. Lovelock predicts the death of billions of people before the equilibrium is established once more. Global warming also increases other weather problems: the average windspeeds of hurricanes have doubled in the past thirty years, and they are also more frequent. That’s not all. Evidence shows that carbon dioxide, a normal result of burning oil or coal, also makes oceans more acidic. Scientists warn that, by the end of the century, this acididty could decimate coral reefs and kill of creates that undergurd the sea’s food chain. “It’s the single most profound environmental change I’ve ever learned about in my entire career,” said Thomas Lovejoy, author of Climate Change and Biodivdersity. What we’re doing in the next decade will affect our oceans for millions of years,” said Ken Caldeira, oceanographer at Stanford University. In addition to our energy and global warming crises we face other severe problems. Thousands of species face imminent extinction. One list of likely canidadates includes a third of all amphibians, a fourth of the world’s mammals, and an eight of its birds. Wilson thinks the foregoing is optimistic and believes two thirds of all species will perish before the end of the century. Nuclear proliferation poses another threat. In 1945 only one country – the United States had the know how and economic means to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Great Britian, the USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and apparently North Korea have joined the nuclear club. If Pakistan and North Korea can do it, clearly almost every nation on earth – and some private organizations, including terrorist groups has the capacity. The United States cam uncomfortably close to using nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1969, and India and Pakistan came uncomfortably close to using them against each other in 2002. In the long run just keeping to the old paths regarding all these new problems is unlikely to work. “From the mere fact that humanity has survived to the present, no hope for the future can be salvaged,” Mushan noted. “The human race can only perish once.¶

#### Vote neg – refusing the narrative of progress is necessary to allow Latin American pedagogical movements to rise up to check dominant narratives of exceptionalism

**Rosenberg ‘6,** Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies and Comparative Literature at Brandeis (Fernando J., The Avant-garde and Geopolitics in Latin America, Google Books, p. 1-6, njw)

**THIS BOOK is about the avant-gardes of Latin America and their critique of modernity**.1 **Rather than engaging in the construction of an alternative modernity** or attempting to renegotiate the modern in relation to the traditional, **these vanguardists**, I contend, **sought to produce a critique of the modern as a global project.**¶ **From the perspective of a narrative of progress, Latin America seems to be cast** either **as a relic from the primitive past** **or as an unrealized but promising future**. **The linear temporality of the Judeo-Christian tradition**— "ascending, descending, progressive or regressive," as Gianni Vattimo (1992, 87) characterizes it—**and its modern varieties**—evolution, decadence, revolution, and novelty—**were** as **deeply embedded in the Latin American discourses of emancipation as they were in every project of modernity**. **But** the difference that the avant-gardes opened to inquiry, a difference that cannot be reduced to the contours of "cultural difference" in the traditional anthropological sense, is that **at both ends of the foundational narrative**—the promise of the future and redemption through and of the past—**Latin American discourse reencountered itself as subject to a larger order**. It is **as if the various futurisms and primitivisms that European movements displayed in an attempt to articulate a reaction against a bourgeois, conservative order** (to express it in blatantly vanguardistic terms) **were untenable from the Latin American position**. For the Latin American avant-gardes, **these alternatives kept referring back to the subaltern situation of Latin Americans themselves vis-a-vis the idea of the West**, a concept that neither clearly included nor excluded Latin America.-¶ **From this position, Latin American avant-gardes could undertake** a critique of modernity and its narratives**, including those of "international"**1 **modernism** and its avant-gardes, **but along a different axis, not through rushing the temporalities of progress** forward or through a return to primitive origins. **Instead, they developed narratives of space that articulated the Latin American situation in a shifting world order.** Some European avant-gardes movements (cubism, dadaism, surrealism, etc.) attempted to undermine the legacy of the Enlightenment and its foundation in the white man as the model of rationality and historical agency under the direction of universal, abstract progress. **Because of their investment in modernity and their peripheral position in its foundational narratives**, however, **Latin Americans were forced to level their criticism through and with a particular attentive-ness to spatial issues** that addressed this problematic inclusion but that were repressed by the same idea of progress that they embraced.¶ This is not to say that Latin American avant-gardes were at any point more "advanced" than their European counterparts. While they tried to unravel European cultural supremacy, European avant-gardes usually remained attached to an assumption of their own universality. Artistic flights overseas were one way in which this was expressed, as the search for non-Western ways of life and perception became an exploration into the repressed soul of the universal human. For Latin American avant-gardists, (many times, no doubt, inspired by the Europeans), that position was untenable because the process of "discovery" was carried out under the suspicion of reproducing colonial dynamics. Therefore, **tracking down influences and assessing the degree to which Latin American movements followed or did not follow European movements, as has been done repeatedly, misses the point and reproduces a colonial logic of unilinear development that**, as we will see, **Latin American avant-gardes tried to destabilize**.¶ Vicky Unruh rightly argues in her seminal book Latin American Vanguards (1994) that **these movements overcame an idea of national and/or continental identity as rooted in an original nature and landscape**.4 What Peter Burger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) called the nonorganic character of the work of art, that is, the possibility of assembling different components with no final resolution of the internal tensions, is akin to this moment in which identity was conceived as a collage (Unruh, chapter 3). The connection Unruh makes between the collagelike constitution of the work of art and issues of national and continental identity is compelling, since ideas of hybridism, transculturation, and cultural anthropophagy or cannibalization—conceptual tools that the avant-gardes favored—traversed the twentieth-century Latin American discussion. But to what degree did the vanguards represent only another step in the constitution of national or regional identities? No doubt, the different movements and writers are inevitably embedded in national traditions. But some **texts of the vanguards**, I propose, **suggest that the question of identity is intertwined with a redefinition of the location of discourses about it in the context of a global negotiation.** In these texts, the problem of loci of enunciation—that is, the conditions of possibility for Latin American artists and writers to intervene in the larger debate about modernity—takes precedence and redefines the problem of identity.¶ **As part of a geopolitical shift that, with the advent of World War I, shook loose the assumptions of nineteenth-century liberal culture, the avant-gardists in Latin America explored** the limits of **a** national, **culturalist response to crisis of the universality of civilization**. The concern of the national Creole elite in the constitution of its hegemony—namely, how to organize the nation (or Latin America, for that matter) so as to inscribe its culture more firmly in the annals of universal history—was for the first time left in suspense, owing to the war that put an end to the nineteenth century's faith in the rationality of European history and the worldwide projection.¶ Since literary criticism in Latin America was by and large engaged in the travails of the national cultural elite, I intend to open up the vanguard texts to this different set of concerns, shedding light by the same token on the makeup of that critical tradition. **I am interested in the moments of interruption when vanguard experiments called attention to contemporary places of identification and symbolic production that were neither national cultures nor reducible to them. Such interruptions occurred as** literary discourses **exhibited an openness to planetary concerns** that resulted in an exploration of vanguardistic ambition. As a result, the vanguards were led to recognize the indebtedness of literary discourses to the reproduction of colonial perspectives and to occupy positions of utterance that they imagined to dislodge this coloniality.¶ "From 1922 (the date is tentative, it is a situation of consciousness that has been defining itself little by little) all that has ended," writes Jorge Luis Borges (1926,15), the vanguardist, in reference to the sea change that set in motion a Latin American artistic and intellectual field that would no longer voice "our longing for Europe."5 Without attempting to reduce cultural production to a set of contextual conditions, I want to point out certain major historical trends that framed this alternative imaginary. The 1920s and 1930s were decades when the political order was reconfigured as the consequence of an ongoing change in the global geopolitical balance following World War I. It was a time of increasing democratization in the Latin American social space, but it was also an era of new pacts between conservative forces in different national arenas. The upheavals and revolutions that provoked regime changes in more than one national context at the end of the 1920s differed in character, yet they shared a common soil, as historian Tulio Halperin Donghi (1996, 371) makes clear:¶ The world crises that erupted in 1929 had an immediate and devastating impact in Latin America, the loudest sign of which was the collapse, between 1930 and 1933, of the majority of the political situations that had consolidated during the good times that came before. What was not immediately evident was that the crash differed from previous complications along the way not only in terms of its unprecedented intensity; this crisis ushered in a new era in which the painful solutions that had allowed the continent to incorporate itself into an increasingly global economy proved ineffectual. 6¶ We are not referring to a discrete event but to a broad historical pattern that subtly undermined faith in the viability of national autonomy as a way to frame, understand, and localize the production of culture. The question of what might constitute Latin Americas possibilities, its conditions of cultural production in this "increasingly global economy," was at stake in many avant-garde texts of the early 1920s.¶ A parallel demographic change touched on the imaginary of positive modernity and its inception in foundational national narratives. The rural-urban balance of power on which modernity as spatial conquest was carried out (that is, the city as a model of govern mentality whose effects were to be projected onto the rest of the territory) was unsettled with the formation of what the historian Jose Luis Romero (1986, chapter 7) called the "massified city." Major demographic changes were already occurring in many Latin American cities and had produced an overall change in the cultural landscape at the end of the nineteenth century. But the vanguard movements were the first artistic enterprises of the cultural elite that didn't react to this shift with strategies of domination, separation, or rejection. Instead, in an effort to cross the "great divide" between mass culture and elite culture, they integrated with and accommodated themselves to the logic of mass production and consumption.' The well-studied phenomena of unabashed promotion of artistic movements, the circulation of ideas through magazines, the interest in new media, and the political engagement with increasingly visible nonelite subjects can all be traced back to the vanguards' attempts to break through the narrowly conceived boundaries of literary culture.¶ This change of cultural practices entailed a broader concern with what I will call positionality. **At a time when the hierarchies embedded in** a notion of a progress **that** promised to spread from center to periphery **and from city to countryside were being questioned, some cultural actors found themselves** **needing to gauge new configurations of production, circulation, and consumption within an expanded horizon, a world-system of attribution of cultural value and meaning. Countering modernity as a merely expansionist force**, to the unilinearity of universal history, **Latin American artistic movements** **would continue to posit places of resistance to anchor their identities in the midst of historical flows**. **Consequently**, the elemental refuge of the baroque rain forest that magically eschews **Western** categories or the boundary-less hinterlands that haunt the gaze of the observer, though refractory of **positivist** **discourse, would continue to be revamped** (by early travelers of the nineteenth century, regional writers of the early twentieth century, and practitioners of magic realism) as a cornerstone of cultural formation. But **the avant-gardes opened the possibility of a different strategy**. Amid so much praise and condemnation of speed and transportation as icons of the universalized, homogeneously modern abolition of spatial constraints, **the vanguards elaborated, for the first time, their own loci of enunciation imbricated in the circulation of goods, discourses, and peoples**. Two seminal manifestos of the early 1920s—one Argentinean, the other Brazilian—are exemplary in that regard:¶ A single struggle—the struggle for the way. Lets divide it up: poetry for import. And Brazilwood poetry for export. (Schwartz 1991, 138)¶ Martin Fierro accepts the consequences and responsibilities of situating oneself. . . . Instructed on his antecedents, his anatomy, the meridian on which he walks, he consults the barometer, the calendar, before stepping into the street in order to live it with the nerves and mentality of nowadays... .8 To accentuate and to expand to the rest of the intellectual activities, the independent movement in language initiated by [poet] Ruben Dario doesn't mean .. . that we will renounce, much less pretend not to recognize, that every morning we use Swiss tooth paste, French towels, and English soap (Schwartz 1991, H3-I4)-9¶ **Two native, national products**, one commercial ("Brazilwood," the first Brazilian export to the metropolis and the source of the regions name) and one cultural (Martin Fierro, the mythic character in the epic poem about an autochthonous gaucho as a founder of Argentinean nationality) **are not only the anchor for a renewed nationalism**, as has been argued widely, **but also become vantage points from which to understand an expanded geopolitics.** **The map projected to elaborate this position needs to be altogether different from the one inherited from the period of nation-state formation**. **The modern and the new**, so the "Manifesto Martin Fierro" seems to claim, **necessarily come from an elsewhere that also has the power to define modernity and its others**, whereas the "Brazilwood manifesto" foregrounds the fact that **what stands as artistically new also depends on a sort of validation that is not at all foreign to a global circulation of commodities**.

### 2

#### Economic engagement entrenches neoliberalism- This designates any hindrance to the market as requiring elimination.

**Essex, Windsor political science professor, 2008**

(Jamey, “The Neoliberalization of Development: Trade Capacity Building and Security at the US Agency for International Development”, Antipode, 40.2, March, ScienceDirect)

The term TCB is relatively new, and is meant to move the international system beyond the impasse between discredited but institutionally entrenched projects of development and aggressive efforts at global trade liberalization. Initially emphasized by developing states in the context of the WTO's 2001 Doha Round of negotiations, TCB has been operationalized in ways that reinforce and extend neoliberalization, focusing development resources on building political and economic capacity to participate in liberalized trade and globalizing markets. In this view, the ability to prosper through free trade drives economic growth and allows the greatest possible flowering of freedom and democracy. States and civil society must be brought into line with market mechanisms—civil society through active cultivation and states through limiting their functions to market facilitation and security provision. Phillips and Ilcan (2004) describe capacity building as one of the primary political technologies through which neoliberal govermentality is constructed and spatialized. They define neoliberal governance as the “ways of governing populations that make individuals responsible for changes that are occurring in their communities”, with responsibility exercised and enforced through markets, which increasingly emphasize “skill acquisition, knowledge-generation, and training programs” (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:397). This perspective highlights the ways in which discourses and practices of capacity building center on the creation and reproduction of social categories that mark off populations as either responsible members of open, market-based communities moving toward development, or irresponsible and potentially dangerous outliers (see Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003). Moving from the latter group to the former depends on acquiring the skills and knowledge that permit individuals to practice responsible behavior and allow for discipline via the marketplace. Diffusion of skills, knowledge, and training—investments in “social capital” and “human capital”—are the driving forces of neoliberalizing development (Rankin 2004). It is in this context, Jessop (2003) points out, that the networks praised by both Castells (1996) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) become a seductive but ultimately empty (and even celebratory) metaphor for understanding and challenging neoliberalization and neoimperialism. A more critical and useful analysis goes beyond recognizing the re-categorization of populations and places along axes of responsibility, and, as noted in the above discussion of the strategic-relational approach to the state, also considers the role of class-relevant social formations and struggles in the expansion and maintenance of political and economic power. A closer examination of how USAID has instituted TCB, and what this means for state institutions' strategic selectivity relative to development and securitization, is one way to analyze the process of neoliberalization and its significance for development and security. For USAID, adopting TCB comprises one means to revise the agency's mission and align it with the unique combination of neoliberal and neoconservative doctrines that dominate US trade and foreign policies. With development understood as a national security issue, USAID and its implementation of TCB have become central to the US state's articulation of the relationship between development, trade, and security. In a 2003 report on TCB, USAID (2003b:3) outlined a three-part framework for enacting successful development through TCB: participation in trade negotiations, implementation of trade agreements, and economic responsiveness to new trade opportunities. USAID portrays this as the most effective way to incorporate developing states into processes of globalization. This also poses new challenges for states, firms, and non-governmental organizations, however, as the “rewards for good policies and institutions—and the negative consequences of weak policies and institutions—are greater than ever”, while economic globalization “has also created the need for better coordination and harmonization” (USAID 2004b:7). USAID's three-part definition repositions development as a form of infrastructure, institution, and network building that can ensure the success of trade liberalization efforts. Defining development as the successful and total integration of a state and its economy into the fabric of neoliberal globalization represents a significant change in the cartography of development through which USAID works, and over which it has great strategic influence. Though national states remain at the heart of this new cartography, USAID development programs now pivot on building state institutions capable (primarily) of enacting and reproducing neoliberal economic policies within the context of capitalist internationalization. As the agency stated in its 2001 TCB report, US development policy “is committed to working in partnership with developing and transition economies to remove obstacles to development, among which are barriers to trade” (USAID 2001:3). The 2003 report likewise singles out trade negotiations as a powerful growth engine for developing countries, so long as they are supported by “sound institutions” that can “ensure transparency and predictability in economic governance, reinforcing economic reforms that are critical for successful development” (USAID 2003b:7). This follows from and reinforces the idea that state-managed foreign aid and assistance, the staple of past USAID programs, must be supportive of, and not a substitute for, trade and economic self-help by developing countries. This position echoes what USAID proclaimed at the development project's height, as discussed above, and relies on the idea that “development progress is first and foremost a function of commitment and political will directed at ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people” (USAID 2004b:11). USAID defines “ruling justly” as “governance in its various dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption”, while “investing in people” involves bolstering “basic education and basic health” services (USAID 2004b:11, fn 8). This language draws from existing discourses of social capital and state effectiveness long favored by Washington Consensus institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Fine 2001; Peet and Hartwick 1999). How closely on-the-ground implementation of TCB hews to these conceptualizations is rather more problematic. The invocation of political will, just rule, and state efficiency are hallmarks of neoliberal rhetoric, and suggests that TCB is the latest in a long line of strategies designed to further capital internationalization and the reproduction of the US-dominated international state system. Yet the vague, catch-all character of TCB in practice indicates that it is less a fully coherent strategic blueprint than the repackaging of existing development activities, meant to bring USAID in line with state and hegemonic projects predicated on the neoliberal doctrine of free trade and the neoconservative obsession with security. A USAID official remarked that initial attempts to institute TCB cast a very wide net: [In the field] you would get these surveys from Washington, and they would say, we're trying to conduct an inventory of all our trade capacity building activities. And in the beginning—and I don't know how this has evolved—but in the beginning of those surveys, I mean, it was sort of ludicrous because virtually anything that we were doing in the economic growth sphere could be described as trade capacity building (interview with the author, December 2004). The broad practical definition of TCB, coupled with the increased emphasis on international markets as a means of alleviating poverty and spurring economic development, belies the continuity between the current focus on trade liberalization and previous development programs. The same USAID official continued: My understanding … was that [developed countries] would ask the developing countries, what do you need in terms of trade capacity building, to get you ready to participate in the WTO and globalized trade regimes? And they would give these long laundry lists that would run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and the developed countries would go, “whoa, we can't do all this” … So we started developing these inventories of all our trade capacity building investments, and one of the objectives of those inventories was so we could talk to the developing world and tell them, look, we're doing all this stuff in trade capacity building already (interview with the author, December 2004). Despite this, there are two important changes that have occurred with the agency's adoption of TCB. The first relates to the institutional relations through which USAID operates; the second centers on changing understandings and practices of security and state weakness. As stated above, the emphasis now placed on ensuring that development is ideologically and institutionally subordinate to trade liberalization places the onus for successful development on “responsible” states that can adequately facilitate capitalist accumulation via free trade. This shift has necessitated that USAID alter the character and intensity of the partnerships through which it plans and implements capacity building and other development programs (see Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, on USAID's subcontracting activities). This has meant changes in how USAID serves as both site and strategy for class-relevant social forces institutionalized in and by the state. The most important partners with which USAID has strengthened or pursued relations to advance capacity building programs have been the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), USDA's trade-focused Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), and internationalizing fractions of capital. TCB therefore must be analyzed not as technocratic jargon, but as a new means of reproducing and re-institutionalizing class-relevant social struggles in and through the national state. The danger USAID faces in so tightly intertwining itself with market-oriented state institutions and capital arises from the continual narrowing of the agency's strategic selectivity—neoliberal doctrine serves as the basis for agency work, and further neoliberalization is the intended outcome. The benefit comes in the form of larger budgets and even the reproduction of USAID itself, and the agency has received large appropriations to implement TCB (see Table 1). While these numbers still represent a small portion of its total budget, TCB has moved quickly up the list of agency priorities, and has gained prominence as a guidepost for continued and intensified neoliberalization (USAID 2004a). It is important to note, however, that even as USAID funding for TCB projects has steadily increased, the agency's proportional share of overall US government spending on such activities has decreased, due to increases in TCB funding channeled into sector-specific trade facilitation activities or into WTO accession, areas where capital and USTR command greater expertise. Geographically, USAID has concentrated TCB funding in states where acceptable neoliberalization is already underway, in areas of geostrategic importance, particularly the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union (USAID 2001:6, 2003c:2), and in those countries eager to engage in free trade agreements. Since 2001, the agency's “TCB funding to countries with which the US is pursuing Free Trade Agreements (Morocco, the Andean Pact, CAFTA, and SACU) more than tripled”, with much of this funding targeted at building institutions compatible with the requirements of WTO accession or specific features of bilateral and regional agreements with the US (USAID 2004a).1 This differs from the geopolitical criteria previously underlying USAID development funding primarily in that trade policy has moved to the center of agency strategies, though this is complicated by emerging national security discourses focused on counter-terrorism and failing or failed states. The second strategically and institutionally important change accompanying USAID's adoption of TCB rests on the altered relationship between development and security, as outlined in the 2002 and 2006 NSS. Here, development bolsters “weak states” that might otherwise become havens for terrorist and criminal networks, which could then pose a threat to American interests abroad and domestically. USAID, the State Department, and the White House have therefore identified development, along with defense and diplomacy, as the three “pillars” of US security strategies (USAID 2004b:8; White House 2002, 2006). The focus on strengthening “weak states” in new development schema demonstrates how the neoliberal understanding of states as rent-seeking regulatory burdens on market relations becomes strategically intertwined with the security concerns and objectives of neoconservatism (USAID 2004b:12; on neoconservatism, see Lind 2004). Two points stand out here. First, recalling that neoliberalization does not only or even primarily imply the rolling back of the state apparatus, the emphasis on TCB demands that “weak” states be strengthened by removing trade barriers and making economic and social policy sensitive to liberalized global market signals. Second, weakness here stems directly from states' inability or unwillingness to properly insinuate themselves into the networks, flows, and institutions of neoliberal capitalism. Distanciation and disconnectedness from internationalizing capital is not only economically wrongheaded, but is the source of political and social weakness, producing insecurity that threatens continued capitalist accumulation under the rubric of neoliberalization. Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003:889) thus identify an emphasis on “enforced reconnection” with the global capitalist system, “mediated through a whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices”. TCB offers a potential and enforceable technical fix for disconnectedness, as being outside neoliberalization is to be against neoliberalization, and thus to pose a security risk. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios made this clear in a May 2003 speech: For countries that are marginalized, that are outside the international system, that are outside development, that are not developing, that are not growing economically, that are not democratizing, look at the different factors that lead to high risk in terms of conflict. Income level is one of the highest correlations between marginalized states and risks in terms of conflicts (USAID 2003a:np). The agency's 2004 White Paper expanded on this to provide a more detailed strategic framework for development and aid programs, establishing a loose taxonomy of states according to the need for development assistance, the commitment to initiate neoliberalization, and the degree to which states are capable and “fair” partners in the use of development resources (USAID 2004b). This geographic categorization was updated and expanded further with the agency's 2006 Foreign Assistance Framework, which bases its categories on criteria developed from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a new (and thoroughly neoliberal) development institution established in 2004 (USAID 2006; see Table 2). In these frameworks, USAID identifies relatively weak institutions, particularly those necessary to establish and maintain market openness and political stability, as the crux of underdevelopment. Running across such taxonomies is a consideration of “strategic states”, a designation that depends less on USAID objectives than on the geostrategic and foreign policy goals of the US executive and Congress. The agency recognizes that the determination of which developing states are considered strategic is a matter for other US state institutions, but also notes: Increasingly, the primary foreign policy rationale for assistance may be matched by or indistinguishable from the developmental or recovery objectives. Thus, the strategic allocation of ESF [Economic Support Fund] and like resources will begin to benefit from the same principles of delineation, selectivity and accountability proposed in this White Paper (USAID 2004b:21).2 Incorporating developing states into networks of neoliberal globalization is, in this view, the essence of producing and maintaining security in line with US foreign policy objectives. This understanding of the link between development, trade, security, and state weakness is echoed in the strategies of other US state institutions, most notably the US Trade Representative (see US Trade Representative 2001). USAID articulates development progress and improved security in terms of the facilitation of liberalized market relations by stable developing state institutions. While more candid interviews with USAID officials indicate that not everyone at the agency is on board with this approach, it has nonetheless become official strategy, and presents a serious contradiction, as development comes to depend on internationalizing and liberalized market forces, even as these remain dominated by predatory finance capital (Harvey 2005; McMichael 1999, 2000a). Internationalizing market relations are fundamentally unstable and, as a means of achieving security outside the narrow concerns of capitalist accumulation, completely insecure. A brief examination of how food security fits into USAID strategies regarding trade, security, and state weakness demonstrates this.

#### Neoliberal engagement of Latin America results in inequality, oppression, and military—moral obligation to put those sacrificed at the center of decision making.

**Makwana 6** (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>, ZBurdette)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization¶ The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the few, writes Rajesh Makwana.¶ The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources.¶ There has been much international attention recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries.¶ The neoliberal experiment has failed to combat extreme poverty, has exacerbated global inequality, and is hampering international aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries.¶ Introduction ¶ After the Second World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe. Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.¶ Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy.¶ The policies were most ardently enforced in the US and Europe in the1980s during the Regan–Thatcher–Kohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives.¶ There is a consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.¶ There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere 0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy. (Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.)¶ Neoliberalism has also been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including China).¶ The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world.¶ The dramatic economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger to ‘freedom and the American way of life’, Cuba has been subject to intense US political, economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at Venezuela’s president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to ‘economic nationalism’ is consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past 150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USA’s main economic objective.¶ According to Maria Páez Victor:¶ “Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the region’s most vicious dictators such as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet.”¶ As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model.¶ So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered a Global Compact with the United Nations, the world’s foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy.¶ However, there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically dominant countries are ‘kicking away the ladder’ to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs.¶ The US and EU also provide huge subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most ‘capitalist’ countries have increased their levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has increased. The requirement is to ‘do as I say, not as I do’.¶ Given the tiny proportion of individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the economy and what serves the public good is growing fast. Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs.¶ Below we examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.¶ Economic Growth¶ Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty.¶ Logically, however, a model for continual financial growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each second by profit hungry corporations.¶ Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty, representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed.¶ The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are both likely causes.¶ Free Trade¶ Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development.¶ With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.¶ The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services, increased inequality and caused environmental destruction.¶ In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers to the tune of £30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be.¶ The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a government’s sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework.¶ These examples represent modern free trade which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of national and global governance to further the free trade agenda.¶ Liberalization¶ The World Bank, IMF and WTO have been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies.¶ According to neoliberal ideology, in order for international trade to be ‘free’ all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.¶ Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US heavily protect their own markets.¶ A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporation’s intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in international markets.

### 3

#### TEXT

THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO BINDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OVER AN OFFER THAT \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### CHINA WILL SAY YES

#### CHINA WILL SAY YES AND WANTS TO CONSULT OVER THE CUBA EMBARGO

PRC Ambassador Wang 12

[Ambassador Wang Min deputy permanent representative of the people's republic of china at the 67th session of the un general assembly on agenda item 41 "necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the united states of america against cuba" States News Service 11/13/12 Westlaw]

Regrettably, however, those resolutions have not been effectively implemented over the years, and the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba imposed by the United States is yet to be lifted. Such practice has inflicted enormous economic and financial losses on Cuba. According to statistics, Cuba's economic losses directly resulting from the embargo had exceeded 108 billion US Dollars by December 2011. Taking into account the depreciation of the US dollar against the price of gold in the international market, the figure would increase to 1.066 trillion dollars. The embargo has caused shortage of commodities and dealt a heavy blow to Cuba's economy. It stands as the major stumbling block for Cuba's economic development and social progress. Besides, such embargo has brought huge sufferings to the Cuban people and violated their fundamental human rights including the rights to food, health and education as well as their rights to survival and development.

We have noted that one of the most prominent features of the embargo in the last year has been interference with Cuba's international financial transactions. This has not only hit Cuba's economy hard, but also affected the normal economic, commercial and financial interactions between other countries and Cuba and hence impairing the interests and sovereignty of third countries.

The embargo against Cuba severely violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the relevant UNGA resolutions and has met the firm opposition of the vast majority of member states. The call of the international community is getting louder and louder, demanding that the US government change its policy towards Cuba, lift embargo and normalize its relations with Cuba. Such calling is fully reflected in this year's Secretary-General's report.

Mr. President,

The Chinese government has always believed that countries should develop mutual relations on the basis of upholding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and respecting the rights of other countries to independently choose their own social system and development path. China is opposed to any unilateral sanctions against other countries by military, political, economic or other means. Meanwhile, China has strictly followed and implemented the relevant GA resolutions. China and Cuba have maintained normal economic, trade and personnel exchanges. The friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation in various fields between our two countries has been growing. This is not only in line with the desire of the two peoples, but also conducive to the economic and social development of Cuba.

In today's world, dialogue, exchanges and harmonious coexistence represent the mainstream of international relations. Exchanges and cooperation on an equal footing among countries have become the dominating trend. In the face of differences, dialogue on an equal footing and friendly consultation are the best means to settle disputes. China hopes that the US will follow the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the relevant GA resolutions and terminate its embargo against Cuba as soon as possible. China also hopes that the relationship between the US and Cuba will constantly improve so as to promote the stability and development in Latin America and the Caribbean region. China will again vote in favor of the draft resolution submitted by Cuba under this agenda item.

#### GENUINE CONSULTATION ON REGIONAL HOTSPOTS NECESSARY TO BUILD A FRAMEWORK OF TRUST NECESSARY TO SAVE US-SINO RELATIONS, IMPACT IS WORLD PEACE

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 12

[Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting Forum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stay committed to peaceful development and win-win cooperation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 28 December 2012 Westlaw]

China and the United States, one the world's largest developing country and the other the biggest developed one, are also the two largest economies in the world. That makes their relationship one of the most important yet complex in the world. Whether the two countries will live amicably with each other is an issue whose significance goes far beyond the bilateral scope and which concerns peace, stability and prosperity of the whole world. Some regard it a law of history that there have always been fierce clashes, at times, conflicts and wars, between an established power and an emerging power. But we reject such fatalism. In our view, in this globalized era when countries are inter-dependent with their interests closely linked, there has been a major shift in international relations. In the face of frequent global challenges, all countries would want to stick together to meet challenges together and pursue common development. This is an unstoppable historic trend. Those who go along with it will prosper and those against it perish. We are sober-minded on this and it is from this perspective that we view and approach China-US relations. We are committed to seeking new answers to old problems and are determined to foster a new major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

What has happened in China-US relations shows that both sides stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Shanghai Communique and the resumption of contact between the two countries. China-US relations have entered a stage where they should no longer have doubts about further growth of this relationship. Over the past 40 years, great progress has been made in China-US relations. In particular, the two presidents have reached important agreement to build a new type of major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, heralding a new, historic starting point for China-US relations. Two-way trade has surged from nearly zero at the time of resumption of contact to 446.6 billion US dollars last year and is expected to exceed 500 billion US dollars this year. The two sides, once in estrangement and confrontation, now engage in dialogue and cooperation. We have had the Strategic and Economic Dialogues (SandED), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange and a total of more than 90 consultation mechanisms covering political, economic, trade, security, defense, scientific, technological, people-to-people, cultural, energy, the environment and many other fields. This is not commonly seen in major-country relations and speaks volumes about the dynamism and potential of China-US relations. More than 3.5 million visits are taking place between the two countries every year, nearly 10,000 every day on average. The two countries have maintained close communication and coordination on counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and regional hotspot issues.

That being said, China and the United States still differ significantly in social system, development stage, history, culture and tradition and still face major and sensitive issues including Taiwan and Tibet-related issues. These issues, if not handled properly, will upset or even seriously damage the bilateral relationship.

To dispel strategic mistrust and build a new type of major-country relationship is a demanding task which calls for unflinching efforts from both sides. At the current stage, I believe it is important for the two countries to do the following:

First, they need to have candid and in-depth communication so as to avoid strategic misjudgment. China and the United States have maintained close high-level contacts and exchanges through quite a number of mechanisms of dialogue and communication including the SandED, the Strategic Security Dialogue and the Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Given the profoundly changing and complex international and regional landscape and the growing destabilizing factors and uncertainties, to have in-depth, candid discussions to find solutions and to strengthen coordination and cooperation will help reduce mutual suspicion and boost strategic mutual trust. Apart from increasing dialogue, coordination and cooperation on global issues and international and regional hotspot issues, it is also important that the two sides truly follow the principle of mutual respect, understand each other's national condition and public opinion, respect each other's choice of social system and development path, and refrain from imposing one's own will on the other side.

#### THESE REGIONAL HOTSPOTS INCLUDE LATIN AMERICA

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Xinhua: 1st Round Sino-US Strategic, Economic Dialogue Concludes in Washington World News Connection July 29, 2009 Westlaw]

IV. On Sino-US Cooperation on International and Regional Issues The two sides discussed the common international challenges facing the two countries. They were resolved to maintain close communication and coordination and work together with the rest of the international community for the settlement of conflicts and reduction of tension that trigger regional and global instability. The two sides noted that traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined, and situations in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and African require combined efforts. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks, the continuing efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the maintaining of peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. They emphasized the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1874 and resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula through peaceful means. The two sides agreed to exert greater efforts for the early realization of the aforementioned goals. The two countries also pledged to increase coordination to jointly promote stability and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They agreed that senior officials from both countries with responsibilities for Iran and the Middle East should continue to consult closely on these issues. The two sides expressed their willingness to increase coordination and consultation on the issue of Sudan to jointly seek an early and enduring political settlement of the Darfur issue and promote the peace process between the north and the south of Sudan.

BOTh sides pointed out their shared opposition to terrorism and pledged to work collaboratively to strengthen global non-proliferation and arms control regimes. They reiterated their respective nuclear policies and discussed the upcoming 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. The two sides also exchanged views on the Global Nuclear Security Summit proposed by the US side and reiterated the importance of existing dialogues on security, arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism issues. The two sides intend to further enhance dialogue and cooperation to combat transnational challenges, such as cross-border crimes, terrorism, the illegal drug trade and piracy.

The two sides agreed to enhance consultation on policy planning, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America within the Strategic Dialogue framework, with a view to broadening and deepening cooperation on issues of mutual concern.

V. On Mechanism for China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue

The two sides expressed their shared view that the SED will continue to advance China-US relations in tandem with other existing bilateral mechanisms. The Dialogue represents a major initiative to further develop China-US relations in the new era, and offers an important platform for the two countries to deepen understanding, enhance mutual trust, and promote cooperation. In order to more fully explore shared solutions on a wide range of common challenges, the Chinese and US delegations look forward to further discussions on specific matters raised at the dialogues through special representatives of the two presidents, working groups, and existing bilateral dialogues.

#### OUR IMPACT IS THE BIGGEST – EVERY IMPACT SCENARIO CAN BE SOLVED BY SINO-US RELATIONS

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Beijing Xinhua in English China's official news service for English-language audiences (New China News Agency)] Xinhua 'Commentary': World Has Every Reason To Closely Watch Obama's China Visit 11/17/09 Westlaw]

As American geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski said at a January seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the two countries' diplomatic ties, China and the United States have become important forces in global political and economic stability.

Since the ice-breaking visit by late U.S. President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 against the backdrop of the Cold War, bilateral cooperation has expanded to the areas of politics, economy, military and culture.

BOTh countries are aware of the importance of their relations.

Though Obama won the presidential election under the banner of "Change," he decided to keep the U.S.' China policy of communications and cooperation unchanged, according to Harry Harding, a leading China specialist in the United States who has advised several presidents.

President Hu Jintao also stressed more than once that healthy development of Sino-U.S. relations is not only in the fundamental interests of both countries, but is also conducive to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Given the interwoven relations that China and the United States share in a global village, both nations see huge potential in seeking their common interests through expanded cooperation.

And major challenges, such as the global economic downturn, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, cannot be tackled by a single country on its own. Instead, they need the joint efforts of the international community, where the United States and China, as two influential countries, should play exemplary roles.

Obama's visit to China offered an opportunity for China and the United States to reach understandings and agreements and seek solutions to a variety of global issues.

China served as an important engine to drive forward global economic recovery while the United States saw its economy reverse the trend of recession in the third quarter of this year.

To reinforce the positive economic momentum and promote global development in a steady, orderly manner, the United States and China need to join hands in the spirit of mutual support.

Among all of the issues, global warming is a problem of immediate consequence. Earlier this month in Barcelona, representatives from more than 40 small-island countries warned during a five-day convention on climate change that any delay in a solution to the problem would increase the possibility of their homes being flooded.

As the world's two major greenhouse gas emitters, how the United States and China will cooperate and assume responsibility is a concern with global ramifications.

Undoubtedly, China and the United States still, and will always, have disagreements, especially in the fields of trade, currencies, greenhouse gas emissions, and political and military trust.

But disagreements provide room for talks, improved communications and enhanced cooperation.

### 4

#### My partner and I advise the following: The United States Federal Judiciary should normalize trade relations with Cuba by ruling the Cuban Embargo as Unconstitutional.

#### 1. The word “advocate” is a good word gone bad. It has strayed from helping people and use for visibility and publicity at the expense of the oppressed.

PICCININI 10. Carlo Piccinini, holds a Master’s Degree in Public Relations and Public Communication from the IULM University in Milan (Italy) and a MA in International Communications from the Institute of Communications Studies (ICS) - University of Leeds (UK).¶ From 1999 through 2007 he worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and from 2002 served as Communication Delegate/Coordinator in the DR of Congo, Eritrea, Sudan (Darfur) and Côte d’Ivoire. From 1986 through 1997 he worked for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as Operations Officer (Rome), and Local Representative for Northern Italy (Milan).Advocacy: A good Word Gone Bad. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 21 February 2010. Section 3.1. MMG

This paper claims is that in today’s conflict-related humanitarian environment, advocacy has become a ‘good word gone bad’. In recent years, when referred to this field advocacy, especially in its public forms, seems to have progressively lost its original and positive connotations and simultaneously assumed growing negative significances. Nowadays, it appears to be away from its original people- and-their-suffering-centered orientation, largely interpreted in political terms, widely used with a ‘speaking out’ approach intended to publicly denounce rights-violating governments and increasingly associated with initiatives aiming at pure visibility goals. Arraying the exercise of influencing key players through advocacy on a continuum ranging from negotiations behind the scenes to public denunciation (Perrin 2002), many organizations seem to increasingly prefer the latter to the former. This ‘deviated’ interpretation and the widespread association of advocacy with the denunciation approach would rally a large consensus within the humanitarian community. Outside analysts seem also to implicitly recognize this deviation when they wonder whether “advocacy in Darfur has gone too far” (Gidley 2007) or when they highlight the need for a better understanding of both the role of agencies in advocacy and the effectiveness of this function (HPG 2007:1).

#### The net benefit is legitimate humanitarianism.

#### 2. The CP solves – “advocacy” fails to produce results that help the oppressed. Moral obligation to stop the subjugation and oppressive military intervention.

PICCININI 10. Carlo Piccinini, holds a Master’s Degree in Public Relations and Public Communication from the IULM University in Milan (Italy) and a MA in International Communications from the Institute of Communications Studies (ICS) - University of Leeds (UK).¶ From 1999 through 2007 he worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and from 2002 served as Communication Delegate/Coordinator in the DR of Congo, Eritrea, Sudan (Darfur) and Côte d’Ivoire. From 1986 through 1997 he worked for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as Operations Officer (Rome), and Local Representative for Northern Italy (Milan).Advocacy: A good Word Gone Bad. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 21 February 2010. Section 3.1. MMG

In the humanitarian crises increasingly induced by politically-laden and intrastate conflicts five aspects seem to have both engendered additional challenges in the implementation of the rights-based advocacy as strategy and introduced some limits to its use. Firstly, in situations like the conflict ‘where the stomachs are empty’, talks about rights lack legitimacy (Uvin 2009). Secondly, the fact that the Human Rights Law (HRL) expresses its content largely in the genre of “manifesto” (Feinberg quoted in Finnis 1980:214) listing a series of “peremptory” and “conclusory”, “assertions” (Finnis 1980: 218) seems to have fostered a militant attitude in agencies’ advocacy efforts. Thirdly, in order to ‘come to earth’ this body of law requires to be translated into “specific three-term relations” (Finnis 1980: 218) in which the rights-holder(s) and the duty-bearer(s) are clearly indentified and the elements of the rights-duties equation clearly outlined (Finnis 1980: 218-9). Yet, while in the human rights system the accountability of the state is clearly defined as “the principal duty holder under international law” (Windfuhr 2000:35) the liability of the others duty-bearer(s) seems not. Harbored in their vague, split and morally impenetrable liability, humanitarian were in their ‘win-win position’ that allowed them to use the militant attitude and the accusatory tones in their advocacy while avoiding the blame. This approach has exacerbated their already challenging relationship with duty-holders. Fourthly, HRL is an international binding instrument for the signatory states but not for non-state actors (NSA). This appears to make the essence of the right-based advocacy workable with the former but unsuitable for the latter. Unless the NSA declares its sensitiveness to the HRL, any attempt of rights-based advocacy to use the denouncing tones would produce feeble results. Lastly, the fact that human rights form a single indivisible package and that they cannot be ranked on a hierarchical scale seems to weaken also the strategy of the right-based advocacy with the states. Uvin argues that in the reality of¶ the conflicts, where the needs are huge and the resources scarce, even the most committed government would face serious defies in implementing core rights such as the right to food (Uvin 2009). Advocating for impossible core rights would weaken the strategy. Advocating with less decisive tones for core rights difficult to implement due to the objective restrictions would justify exceptions that are simply unacceptable from both the RBA and HRL perspectives.

#### 3. The word “advise” solves better – it informs the oppressed people on courses of action but does not force it. And, “advocate” and “advise” are mutually exclusive.

ELITE 09. Enabling Living Independently Today and Everyday – a human rights group that publishes papers and articles on the various forms of humanitarianism. Advocacy Definition; <http://www.elitestaffordshire.co.uk/uploads/file/Advocacy%20Definition.pdf> MMG

Offers guidance and direction on a particular course of action which needs to be undertaken in order to realise a need, access a service or realise individual entitlements. (Rowntree, 2003: 9).¶ Advocacy is not interchangeable with giving information and advice. While an advocate does gather information and may show which of a number of alternatives are the most reliable and useful, they do not do not offer advice on¶ a decision or course of action they think to be in the best interests of the person.

### CASE Things

#### The Cuban transition will be gradual and stable – Diaz-Canel makes a political transition inevitable

**López-Levy, 13** - PhD candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (Arturo, “Getting Ready for Post-Castro Cuba,” The National Interest, 4/10, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba-8316>)

In the last five years, the Cuban government has created an important institutional foundation for a parallel transition to a mixed economy (symbolized by the encouragement of non-state-sector firms) and a post-totalitarian relationship between the state and civil society (symbolized by relaxed travel restrictions).¶ With the election of a new Council of State in February, the last phase of the transition to the post-Castro era began. Raúl Castro was reelected to the presidency, and for the first time a leader born after 1959, Miguel Díaz-Canel, became his second in command. Although this gradual transition is unfolding with the same party and president in power, one can begin to discern a new leadership and changing priorities.¶ Looking at the Communist Party as a corporation (an analogy that should not be abused), Díaz-Canel is a manager who has served at various levels of the production chain. He worked at its foundation, as a university teacher and youth leader. Later, in the strategic provinces of Villa Clara and Holguin, he administered the implementation of economic reforms and directed the opening of the economy to foreign investment and tourism—all while maintaining party control over both processes.¶ Díaz-Canel is part of the network of provincial party czars who are important in the implementation of the proposed changes, particularly decentralization. Having worked in central and eastern Cuba, the new first vice president has cordial ties with regional commanders of the armed forces—the other pillar, along with the Communist Party, of the current Cuban system. He is a civilian, the first in the line of succession to have little military experience. But he is steeped in the networks of power and well versed in carefully managing reform.¶ Challenges for Cuban Leaders¶ If Cuba implements the type of mixed economy proposed by the last Congress of the Communist Party—a new, more vital relationship with its diaspora and the world—it may also experience a political transformation. As the economy and society change, the political status quo cannot hold. The rise of market mechanisms and an autonomous non-state sector will reinforce the newly open flows of information, investment and technology. These new sectors will seek representation in the political arena. Citizens will have greater access to the Internet, and will be able to associate more horizontally.¶ For at least the next five years, this does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy. But economic liberalization will force an expansion of the current system. Economic and migration opportunities will channel some of the energy in the direction of new businesses and travel, but it will not be enough. The party system will be reformed in order to remain at the helm of social and economic life. Political liberalization will probably start in the lower rungs of government, allowing citizens to vent their frustrations at that level. Raúl Castro’s decision to limit leadership positions to two terms, at a time when the older generation is leaving power by attrition, will result in a more institutionalized leadership that promotes younger leaders in an orderly fashion.

#### Lifting the Embargo would pressure Cuba for rapid reforms

**Cave, 12** – foreign correspondent for The New York Times, based in Mexico City and has a B.A. from Boston College and an M.S. from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism (Damien, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NY Times, 11/19/12, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//EX)

Still, in a country where Cubans “resolve” their way around government restrictions every day (private deals with customs agents are common), many Cubans anticipate real benefits should the United States change course. Mr. López, a meticulous mechanic who wears plastic gloves to avoid dirtying his fingers, said legalizing imports and investment would create a flood of the supplies that businesses needed, overwhelming the government’s controls while lowering prices and creating more work apart from the state. Other Cubans, including political dissidents , say softening the embargo would increase the pressure for more rapid change by undermining one of the government’s main excuses for failing to provide freedom, economic opportunity or just basic supplies. “Last month, someone asked me to redo their kitchen, but I told them I couldn’t do it because I didn’t have the materials,” said Pedro José, 49, a licensed carpenter in Havana who did not want his last name published to avoid government pressure. “Look around — Cuba is destroyed,” he added, waving a hand toward a colonial building blushing with circles of faded pink paint from the 1950s. “There is a lot of work to be done.”

#### Slow change key to Cuban reform - avoids rapid regime collapse

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\_cuba\_feinberg.pdf)

Gradualism: Gradualism in economic reform—as opposed to an Eastern European-style sudden regime collapse—appears to be the most likely scenario that Cuba will follow. As a result of economic reforms, albeit halting and partial, Cuba today is different from the Cuba of 1989 . In 2011, Cuba’s current leadership, however aging and proud, promulgated reform guidelines that recognize the imperative of change and that empower the pro-reform factions. Moreover, as suggested by successful Asian experiences (Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, China), where political leadership provides stability and continuity, gradualism can be a feasible—indeed it may well be the only realistic—option. Gradualism must not, however, be an excuse for policy paralysis or a smoke-screen for maintenance of the status quo.

#### Rapid change risks Cuban civil war

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf>)

Some in the United States have long supported severe sanctions intended to starve the Cuban regime of resources and thereby precipitate a political breakdown . Yet, within the national security bureaucracy of the U .S . Executive Branch, notwithstanding occasional presidential rhetoric, there is a strong preference for gradual, peaceful evolution in Cuba . A sudden breakdown, it is feared, would entail substantial risks for U .S . interests, including an immigration crisis right off of our shores, and in the worst case, irresistible pressures for intervention to quell a bloody civil war and halt a mass exodus of refugees.

#### Failed transition and LA instability turns every part of the aff

**NAÍM, 1** – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, “When Countries go Crazy”, MARCH 1, 2001, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when\_countries\_go\_crazy)

Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is because of imbalances in the brain’s neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián. The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything the world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism. This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: Failure is more common than success in the transition to a democratic market economy. Lesson two: The less internationally integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Lesson three: Dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Lesson four: The brutal, criminal ways of a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Lesson five: Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. It is therefore safe to assume that if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. But that is not the assumption on which U.S politicians base their efforts to hasten Castro's demise. Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era democracy will emerge and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a capitalist hub. More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between Cuban-Cubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable. New investments and privatizations will be mired in the legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than $17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners. (That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) The Cuban public sector is inextricably intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will paralyze the government, at least for a while. And the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers, who will likely pay much more than the $2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994. But can't the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund support Cuba's transition with money, experts, and projects? Sure, except that the United States forbids them from spending even a dollar to prepare themselves and Cuba for the coming transition. The result is that these institutions are not ready to help Cuba. Again, the United States forgets a useful lesson from another continent: The day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands at the White House in 1993, the World Bank -- ­­­which had been instructed to prepare for the event -- was immediately ready to lend and invest in projects under the control of the Palestinian Authority, even though the authority was not and still is not a member of the bank. Allowing such an initiative in Cuba's case would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing and would help plan for the challenges ahead. Also, training Cuban professionals to run a modern market economy is bound to be a better investment for the United States than blocking academic exchanges with the island. The rational, self-interested approach for the United States that also avoids much future human pain in Cuba is to concentrate all efforts on ensuring as smooth a transition as possible. This view, of course, is not shared by all. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms recently said that "the opponents of the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo." The failure of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to achieve its stated objectives over the last 40 years is dismissed by Senator Helms and some Cuban-Americans who argue that the embargo has never been vigorously implemented. Perhaps, as Senator Helms predicts, things are about to change and the aging Cuban dictator will finally fall. If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles away from U.S. shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid, President Bush will have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to the lessons of experience.

#### The Aff commodifies suffering – their use of the suffering of the people of Cuba to win the ballot is distinctly bad.

#### Translating suffering into capital is a perverse system of corporatized neoimperial academia – oppression becomes a commodity assigned an artificial value – turns the aff.

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.